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FUSL000033

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS
x

In the Matter of the Application of

PETITION

Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

-against-

Index N

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE
Respondent.
•

x

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
The Petition of

1.

respectfully alleges that:

This is a special proceeding brought pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil

Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”).
VENUE

2.

Pursuant to CPLR §§ 7804(b) and 506( b), venue of this proceeding is

proper in Dutchess County because this is the county in which the Parole Board sat
for Petitioner’s parole interview.
3.

Petitioner is challenging the unlawful determination of his April 25,

2017 parole release application.
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PARTIES
4.

an inmate presently

Petitioner is

incarcerated and in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), assigned Department Identification Number

Correctional Facility,

currently located at

5.

Respondent is the New York State Board of Parole, a State body charged

with, inter alia , conducting parole release interviews in accordance with the
provisions of Correction Law, Executive Law and New York Codes, Rules and
Regulations.

FACTS
6.

On August 17, 1994,

ind his accomplices entered a liquor

store and displaying a handgun, handcuffed a male employee and put duct tape on his
mouth.. They stole approximately $5,000 in cash and several bottles of liquor. On
and an accomplice again entered a liquor store and while

August 24, 1994,

displaying a handgun, stole $2,000, a cordless phone and jewelry. On August 31 ,

1994, 1

and an accomplice entered a liquor store and armed with two hand

guns, stole cash, jewelry and liquor. The store owner, also armed with a handgun,

followed

scene,

car, exchanging gunfire. In the process of fleeing the crime
struck a

}. The boy was thrown in
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the air and landed on his head , suffering fatal injuries. Taking full responsibility for

his criminal conduct,

pled guilty to two counts of robbery in the first

degree and one count of murder 2nd, for which he was sentenced to 12 4 to 25 years
/

and 15 years to life.

( is currently serving an aggregate term of 15 years to

life, and at the time of his parole interview, had been incarcerated for almost 23 years,

8 years beyond the court ordered minimum sentence.
7.

ippeared before his fifth parole board on April 25, 2017, was

denied release on April 28, 2017 and ordered held for an additional 18 months.

8.

filed an Administrative Appeal on or about August 17, 2017

( See Exhibit 1 (Administrative Appeal )). The denial was upheld on September 14,

2017 ( See Exhibit 2 (Administrative Appeal Decision Notice)).
EXHAUSTION

9.

Based on the foregoing facts,

has exhausted all of his

administrative remedies and therefore, this Article 78 is both timely and ripe.
10.

now seeks vacatur of the Parole Board denial, based on the

regulatory and statutory violations of his rights as set forth below.
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ARGUMENT
THE PAROLE BOARD VIOLATED FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS WHEN
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
|
Pg)
YOUTH AS A MITIGATING FACTOR WHEN
EVALUATING HIS CRIMINAL HISTORY

£HHI

11.

When the offender was a juvenile at the time of the offense, the Parole

Board is constitutionally “required to consider the significance of
youth and attendant circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime before
making a parole determination.” (See Matter of Hawkins v. New York State

Department of Corrections and Community Supervision , 140 A.D.3d 34 (3ld Dept
April 26, 2016)). Similarly, if the Parole Board wishes to rely on an inmate’s prior

criminal history as a juvenile to justify denying release, it must consider the
“attendant circumstances” of that history in the context of the inmate’s age ( Id.).
12 .

In light of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v.

Alabama , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463(2012 ) and Hawkins v. New York State Department of

Corrections and Community Supervision , supra ), the law in New York now
recognizes neuroscience, and the fact that children are different from adults. “ It’s
about time that New York state is recognizing that juveniles are different,’ said Phil
Desgranges, an attorney with the New York Civil Liberties Union. ‘The science bears

this out: The brains of juveniles are not fully developed. They have greater
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impulsivity” ( See Exhibit H ( New York Now Considers Youth as a Factor for
Inmates ’ Parole - Associated Press)).

13.

In 1988, at age 16, traumatized, addicted to drugs and alcohol , living on

the streets and unprepared for the juvenile justice system ]

|was adjudicated

a juvenile delinquent and convicted of robbery in the second degree, assault and
criminal possession of stolen property, for which he was sentenced to one year of
probation. At age 17,

violated that probation with a second juvenile

delinquent conviction of robbery in the second degree, attempted robbery in the
second degree and criminal possession of stolen property, for which he was sentenced

to one year in Division for Youth , running concurrent with the original sentence of

one year of probation.
14.

|criminal history

at ages 16 and 17 should be reviewed in

light of the unique circumstances of his history and attendant circumstances. An
adolescent’s criminal history as a troubled and traumatized juvenile delinquent should

not preclude a meaningful opportunity for parole as an adult ( See Matter of Dukes v.
Stanford; Index No. 210- 16 (Sup.Ct. Albany Cty. 2016)); ( Matter of Darshan v. NYS

DOCCS, Et at , Index No. 652/2017 (Sup.Ct. Dutchess Cty. 7/18/17))
15.

1

( record and attendant circumstances show a highly troubled

16 year old adolescent who was having difficulty at home with his parents and who

was released in 2017 and has not been re-imprisoned .
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“was hard headed. They threw me out of the house. I was living on the streets” ( See
Exhibit B (Transcript, pp 7, lines 8-10).

16.

The Board recognized that

jjuvenile history started “during

that time of living on the streets, after being thrown out from your parents’ house, the

juvenile arrests occurred .” ( Id . pp 7, lines 2-4)).

17.

The Board went on to list the two juvenile convictions, one in Kings

County and one in New York County ( Id . pp 7) and asked|

| to explain how

his “crime escalated from JD, just continued to keep going and getting more severe?”
(Id. pp 7, line 25 - 8, line 2).

18.

|took responsibility, explaining that it was not the drugs or his

parents, rather it was his “ terrible decision” (Id . pp 8), not listening to his parents,

anger at his father over the abuse of his mother, as well as his own abuse.
19.

“ Here neither the hearing transcript nor the Board ’s written

determination reflects that the Board met its constitutional obligation to consider
Appellant’s youth, his emotional and educational disabilities ( id.) , as well as his

attendant characteristics in relationship to his criminal history. The Eighth
Amendment ‘requires’ a sentence! to consider a juvenile [delinquent]’s youth and
'

attendant characteristics” [emphasis added] ( See Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra ).

FUSL000033

The Board must do more than just mention factors to give meaningful review. (See
matter of Ramirez v. Evans , 118 A.D.3d 707, 987 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2nd Dept. 2014).2

20.

The Parole Board peppered

|with questions regarding his

juvenile delinquent offenses and how this behavior escalated ( Id. pp 7 - 10) and it

then went on to disregard

21 .

explanation .

“ It is axiomatic that a juvenile [delinquent] could only prove increased

maturity and rehabilitation warranting release from custody at some time well after a

sentence is imposed.” (See Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 48 ( “ Wyo. 2013) (“logic
dictates that to effectuate the sentence imposed . . . the parole board must provide a

meaningful determination and review”).

22.

In making parole determinations that take into account a juvenile

delinquent’s criminal history, the Parole Board must consider the “significance of
youth and attendant circumstances at the time of the commission of the

crime” in order to fulfill the “minimal procedural requirement necessary to ensure the

substantive Eighth Amendment protections.” (See Hawkins v. New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision , supra ).
23.

has overcome enormous obstacles to reform and become a

positive and rehabilitated man. The Board failed in its Constitutional duty to give

2

Santiago Ramirez was released in 2017 and has not been re-imprisoned .
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meaningful consideration to the Eighth Amendment protections that
should have had . During his interview, Commissioner Cruse said to
“There’s no question, you’ve got a rough past, sir, we all got a story to tell, but committing
crime is not the way to do it.” (Id. pp 10, lines 9 12).

-

24.

The Commissioner then went on to make an erroneous conclusion,

arbitrarily and improperly assigning a motive for

instant offense, to wit:

|. Popped him up in the air, so he came down on his
“You’ve killed a
head; because you wanted to steal from somebody, to get back at your parents”
(Id. pp 10)
“You are the center of your story, you, you, not your dad ’s behavior, you” (Id . pp 10)

25.

Commissioner Cruse totally disregarded

“attendant

circumstances.” (The abuse he and his mother suffered.)

26.

The Commissioner then dangerously opined on the mindset of a 16 year

old child raised under the harshest of circumstances as to what his current instant

offense was motivated by. As a matter of law, the Board cannot give their personal
opinions. ( See Matter of King v. New York State Division of Parole, 190 A. D.2d

423, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 ( 1st Dept. 1993), (affd 83 N.Y.2d 788, 610 N .Y.S.2d 954
1994)).

27.

|has served over eight years beyond his mandatory minimum

legal sentence and has accumulated a long and uninterrupted record of continuous

achievement, as well as recommendations from staff, treatment, and testaments to his

rehabilitation. Further,

has a stable environment to parole to, with a
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residence and an actual employment offer, as well as support groups (See Exhibit F
( Parole Packet)).

28.

The societal interest in just punishment has therefore been satisfied.

Surely, that interest is not compromised in the slightest by admitting such an offender

to parole. Appellant is that offender. Justice will be served, not compromised, by
admitting him to parole.
29.

Recognizing that children are inherently different from adults and

acknowledging the Board’s need to be in compliance with the Constitutional

mandates of Montgomery, Miller and Hawkins , the Board reversed its determination

on administrative review in

Appeal Control #05-033-16 B, Rev.

11/25/16 (“ requirements of Hawkins not properly developed in interview and
Decision”) ( See Exhibit P (|
reversed

30.

Decision )); (The Board also administratively

granting him a de novo interview ).

was entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release in which

his youthful criminal history and its attendant characteristics in conjunction with his

rehabilitation and current offense were considered by the Board.

31.

The Parole Board in boilerplate fashion denied

parole

application, giving mere lip service to the tragic circumstances of his childhood and

no Eighth Amendment consideration to his criminal history ( See Hawkins v. New
York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, supra ) ; ( Ramirez
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v. Evans, supra ) ( merely mentioning a factor is not enough to show meaningful

review). The record is devoid of any showing of how the Board considered
youthful circumstances, which the Board in this decision clearly viewed

as an area of concern without any Eighth Amendment explanation.
“Parole Decision:

DENIED - HOLD FOR 18 MONTHS, NEXT APPEARANCE DATE: 10/2018
Conditions of Release/Staff Instructions/Reasons for Denial:

AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD, INTERVIEW, AND DELIBERATION,
THE PANEL HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME,
THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE
AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT AGAIN VIOLATING THE LAW AND
THAT YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE
AND SAFETY OF SOCIETY AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS
NATURE OF THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.
PAROLE IS DENIED.
REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED,
TOGETHER WITH YOUR INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT INCLUDING
DISCIPLINE AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION , YOUR RISK AND NEEDS
ASSESSMENT, AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL RE- ENTRY INTO
THE COMMUNITY. MORE COMPELLING IS THAT THE INSTANT OFFENSE
MARKS YOUR FIRST NEW YORK STATE INCARCERATION , RESULTING
IN YOUR CONVICTION FOR MURDER 2 ND ( A - l ), ROBBERY 1 ST ( B ), AND
ANOTHER ROBBERY 1 ST ( B), GIVEN THE FOLLOWING INDICTMENTS;
4206/94 WHEN YOU IN CONCERT ENTERED A BUSINESS
ESTABLISHMENT DISPLAYED A HANDGUN, HANDCUFFED AND DUCT
TAPED THE MOUTH OF AN EMPLOYEE. IN ADDITION , YOU DUCT TAPED
THE MOUTH OF A CUSTOMER. YOU STOLE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT
OF CASH, BOTTLES OF LIQUOR AND JEWELRY FROM A CUSTOMER ;
4205/94 YOU IN CONCERT ENTERED A BUSINESS, DISPLAYED A
HANDGUN, STOLE S 2000, A BRACELET AND A CORDLESS PHONE FROM
THE BUSINESS. ALSO YOU STOLE A CHAIN FROM AN EMPLOYEE.
4177/94 YOU IN CONCERT ARMED WITH HANDGUNS FORCED THE
OWNER OF A BUSINESS DOWNSTAIRS IN HIS STORE. YOU TOOK
JEWELRY, CASH AND LIQUOR FROM THE STORE. YOU DROVE THE CAR
USED TO FLEE THE SCENE. WHILE DRIVING, YOU STRUCK A
ON A BICYCLE, THROWING HIM INTO THE AIR, SUFFERING
FATAL INJURIES. YOUR CRIMINAL HISTORY CONTINUED FROM YOUR
JD YEARS CULMINATING WITH THE INSTANT OFFENSE. YOUR
PROBATION EFFORT FEATURED VIOLATION. THE INTERVIEW

FUSL000033

REVEALED A CHILDHOOD WHERE YOU WITNESSED DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, AND ANGERY (sic) WITH YOUR FATHER RESULTING IN
YOUR BEING EJECTED FROM THE HOUSEHOLD LAUNCHING A
JUVENILE DELINQUENT LIFESTYLE. THE RECORD FEATURES MENTAL
HEALTH ISSUES OF WHICH YOU STATE ARE CURRENTLY UNDER
CONTROL. THE PANEL NOTES YOUR PAROLE PACKET, YOUR PROGRAM
COMPLETION AND CLEAN DISCIPLINE. YOUR COMPAS SCORE IS LOW
OVERALL. THE PANEL REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR RE ENTRY
SUBSTANCE ABUSE SCORE AS PROBABLY 4 OF 10. COCAINE AND
MARIJUANA WERE YOUR DRUGS OF CHOICE. YOUR CASE PLAN IS
SATISFACTORY . YOUR FILE FEATURES LETTERS OF SUPPORT AND
LETTERS OF OPPOSITION. SPEND YOUR TIME CONTINUING A POSITIVE
PATH DEVELOPING FAMILY TIES, AND STRENGTHENING RELEASE
OPTIONS FOCUSING ON A DOCUMENTED RELAPSE PREVENTION PLAN .”

-

32.

At each of

failed to give

previous interviews, the Board consistently

[juvenile delinquent criminal history and juvenile features

any real Eighth Amendment consideration or any Constitutional compliance.

33.

The Board must do “ more than merely mouth” the criteria for release

consideration (See Matter of Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc.3d 1009( A ), 801

N.Y .S.2d 244 ( SupCt . New York Cty. 2005 ) )3 “[ njoting” a concern or behavior is not
tantamount to considering them in a fair, reasoned and individualized manner (See

Matter of Chan v. Travis, Index No. 3045-02 (Sup.Ct. Albany Co. 2003)). Statutory
factors must be meaningfully considered ( See Matter of Perfetto v. Evans, 112
A. D.3d 640, 976 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2nd Dept . 2013)).4

34.

As further recognition of why juvenile delinquent criminal history

should be viewed in light of the Eighth Amendment , New York State raised the age

J
4

-

Herbert Weinstein was released in 2006 and has not been re imprisoned.
Gary Perfetto was released in 2016 and has not been re imprisoned.

-
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of responsibility in April of 2017, from 16 to 18 years of age and in September 2017,
the Board adopted changes to 9 NYCRR § 8002.3, mandating that in a parole release

decision, the Board shall consider “the diminished culpability of youth ; and [gjrowth
and maturity since the time of the commitment of offense.”

35.

In light of the Board ’s failure to properly and lawfully consider
criminal history, the Board’s denial of

application for

release was irrational bordering on impropriety, as well as arbitrary and capricious

is entitled to a de novo parole release interview.

and

THE PAROLE BOARD IMPROPERLY
BASED ITS DECISION TO DENY PAROLE
RELEASE SOLELY ON THE NATURE OF
THE INSTANT OFFENSE
36.

The law is clear that the nature and severity of the crime standing alone

is not sufficient to sustain a denial of parole and a determination based solely on the
severity of the offense is “irrational and must be annulled .” ( See Matter ofWallman v.

Travis,18 A.D.3d 304, 794 N.Y.S.2d 381 ( 1st Dept. 2005)).5

37.

“The 2011 amendments to Executive Law § 259-c (4) requires the Parole

Board to give adequate consideration to an inmate’s efforts at rehabilitation. Its

determination must be sufficiently detailed so as to apprise

of the

reasons for the denial of his parole release.” ( See Matter of Stokes v. Stanford , 43
Misc.3d 1231( A ), 993 N . Y.S.2d 646 (Sup.Ct. Albany Cty. 2014)).
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38.

As such, Executive Law requires that parole boards must consider the

seriousness of the underlying crime in conjunction with the seven (7) other factors
enumerated in the statute, ( See Executive Law § 259-i{2), and 9 NYCRR § 8002.3),

as well as conduct a risk assessment analysis to determine if an inmate has been
rehabilitated and is ready for release. See Executive Law §§ 259-c( 4); 259-i(2)(a);
( See also Matter of Rabenbauer v. New York State Department of Corrections &

Community Supervision, 46 Misc.3d 603, 995 N.Y.S. 2 d 490 (Sup.Ct. Sullivan Cty.
2014)).6
39.

In Matter of Morales v. New York State Board of Parole, Index No.

934/2017 (Sup.Ct. Dutchess Cty., Sept. 8, 2017), Hon. Victor Grossman, granting a

de novo parole interview to the petitioner, stated ;
“The minimal attention, barely lip service, given to these factors cannot be justified
given the amount of time already served. The ‘Parole Board denied petitioner’s

request to be released to parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense,’
and its ‘explanation for doing so was set forth in conclusory terms, which is contrary
to law’ Matter of Perfctto v. Evans, 112 A.D. 2d 640, 641(2d Dept. 2013), citing
Matter of Gelsomino v. New York State Bd . of Parole. 82 A.D.3d 1097, 1098 (2d
Dept. 2011 ); see also Matter of Thwaites v. New York state Bd . of Parole. 34 Misc.
694, 701 (Sup.Ct. [Orange] 2011 ); see generally Matter of Silmon v . Travis. 95
N , Y ,2d 470, 476 (2000). Moreover, the fact that the Board barely mentioned, in its
determination, Petitioner’s rehabilitative efforts and education while incarcerated
leads the Court to conclude that denial of parole was an inevitable event. [ ] As a
final note, this Court cannot keep silent, finding once again, that the despite the
growing body of decisions that have been issued from the courts ... over the recent
years, Respondent continues to generate boilerplate rulings that fail to address the
specific details of each case when determining parole, resorting to listing some of the
statutory factors allegedly considered without any attempt at tailoring each decision
to each inmate. Simply put, ‘ there is no effort to provide even minimal insight into
how the Board’s consideration of the statutory factors led to its ultimate conclusion
5
6

-

Jay Wallman as released in 2005 and has not been re imprisoned.
Philip Rabenbauer was released in 2015 and has not been re imprisoned.

-
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that the denial of parole was warranted.’ Williams v . New York State Parole of Bd ..
2015 WL 5840089, 2015 N .Y. Slip.Op. 31820( U) (Sup.Ct. [St. Lawrence]
September 30, 2015.”

40.

In Matter of Kelly , Hon . Victor Grossman stated:
“Despite inter alia , Petitioner’s no history of violence, no prior contact with the
criminal justice system, his accomplishments while in prison, and his planned
employment and relocation upon release, the Board summarily denied his application
without any explanation other than by off-handedly reiterating some of the statutory
factors, and focusing on the instant offense. The minimal attention, barely lip
service, given to these factors cannot be justified given the amount of time already
served . The ‘ Parole Board denied petitioner’s request to be released on parole solely
on the basis of the seriousness of the offense,’ and its ‘explanation for doing so was
set forth in conclusory terms, which is contrary to law.’ Matter of Pcrfetto v. Evans.
112 A.D.3d 640, 641 (2d Dept. 2013), citing Matter of Gelsomino v. New York State
Bd . of Parole. 82 A.D.3d 1097, 1098 (2d Dept. 2011); see also Matter of Thwaites v.
New York State Board of Parole. 34 Misc.3d694, 701 (Sup.Ct.[Orange] 2011); see
generally Matter of Silinon v. Travis. 95 N . Y.2d 470, 476 (2000). Moreover, the fact
that the Board did not even address Petitioner’s rehabilitative efforts and education
while incarcerated in its determination [ ] lends the Court to conclude that denial of
parole was an inevitable event.” ( See Matter of Kelly v. New York State Board of
Parole , Index No. 580/2017 (Sup.Ct. Dutchess Cty., 7/28/17, pp 3 4)).

-

41 .

In Matter of Ely v. New York State Board of Parole, Hon. Barbara Jaffe,

in granting a de novo parole interview, stated:
“In determining whether the Board has satisfied the statutory criteria, its written
decision must be evaluated in the context of the entire proceeding, including the
petitioner’s parole hearing (Matter of Jackson v. Evans , 118 A.D.3d 701 , 702 [2d
Dept 2014], but the Board may not summarily itemize a petitioner’s achievements
while incarcerated or render a conclusory decision parroting the statutory standard
( Matter of Rossalcis, 41 NYS3d at 494-495). [ ] While respondent may assign as
much weight as it deems necessary to the seriousness of petitioner’s crime, its
decision nevertheless reflects a marked disinclination to consider her achievements
and other mitigating factors or explain how or why they are outweighed by the
severity of the crime. [ ] Respondent’s contention that due consideration was given
these factors during petitioner’s interview is not supported by the record, which
reflects that few meaningful questions were asked and little analysis given to her
mitigating evidence beyond the conclusory finding that it was ‘contradicted ’ by the
seriousness of the crime.” ( See Matter of Ely v. New York State Board of Parole ,
Index No. 10040716 (Sup.Ct. New York Cty., January 20, 2017)).

-
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42.

In Matter of Darshan , Hon. James D. Pagones stated:
is that
“The Board of Parole’s official reasoning for denying release to
the
..
society
, and
his ‘ . release would be incompatible with
welfare and safety of
would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the
law.’ This is an example of the Board ’s standard, boilerplate language in regard to
parole denials. While it is not disputed that the Board is entitled to broad discretion
in making parole determinations, the rationale for denying parole must be given in
detail and not in conclusory terms ( see Executive Law § 259-i[2][ a][ I ]; Matter of
Wallman v. Travis, 18 AD3d 304 [ lsl Dept. 2005].).” (See Matter of Darshan v. New
York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Et. al , Index No.
652/2017 (Sup.Ct. Dutchess Cty., 7/18/17, pp 9-10). 7
'

43.

In Matter of Mackenzie , Hon. Maria G. Rosa stated :
“ While a parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory factor,
and is pennitted to place a greater emphasis of the gravity of the underlying criminal
conviction, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, a parole hoard may not
deny release solely on the basis of the seriousness of the underlying offense.
Huntley v. Evans. 77 AD3d945 (2nd Dept. 2010 (emphasis added ).” (See Matter of
Mackenzie v. Stanford, Index No. 2789/15 (Sup.Ct. Dutchess County 2016)).

44.

In Matter of Weinstein , Hon . Shirley Werner Kornreich stated :
“The seriousness of the crime, of course, may be considered by the Board, but the
‘conviction per se’ should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some kind
of aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself ”
( See Matter of Weinstein v. Dennison, supra, quoting King v. New York State
Division of Parole , 190 A.D.2d 423, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1 st Dept. 1993), (affd 83
N.Y.2d 788, 610 N .Y.S.2d 954 ( 1994)).

45. The Appellate Division, Second Department, held in Ramirez v. Evans,
supra that “[a]though the decision of the New York State Board of Parole ...

mentioned

...

institutional record, it is clear that the Board denied

release solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense ( See Matter of Gelsomino
v. New York State Board of Parole, 82 A.D.3d 1097, 918 N.Y.S.2d 892 (2nd Dept.

was released in 2017 and has not been re-imprisoned.

FUSL000033

2011 )).8 The Board ’s explanation for doing so was set forth in conclusory terms,

which is contrary to the law” See Executive Law § 259-i (2)(a); (See also Matter of
Perfetto v. Evans, supra ), ( .Matter of Mitchell v. New York State Division of Parole,
'

58 A.D.3d 742, 743, 871 N .Y.S.2d 688 ( 2nd Dept. 2009)).9
46.

By merely noting the accomplishments and programming and barely

mentioning the COMPAS Risk Assessment scores and Case Plan , the decision failed
to articulate any rational , non-conclusory, basis other than its reliance upon the

seriousness of the crime (See Matter ofThwaites v. NYS Board of Parole, 34 Misc.3d
694, 934 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup.Ct. Orange Cty. 2011 ) ). The Board ’s decision did not
sufficiently articulate, in detailed fashion, the reasons for the denial of
request , and failed to inform him of the factors and reasons for the denial , in detail ,

and not in conclusory terms, so as to enable intelligent judicial review of the Board ’s
decision. ( See Matter of Mitchell v. New York State Division of Parole, supra );
( Matter of West v. New York State Board of Parole, 41 Misc.3d 1214( A), 980

N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup.Ct. Albany Cty. 2013));10 ( Matter of Malone v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d

719 (2 nd Dept. 2011 )).
47.

Similarly, the Court inRabenbauer, supra . , ruled that “... the Division of

Parole can not forever rely on the nature and seriousness of the underlying offense

8

Louis Gelsomino was released in 2011 and has not been re- imprisoned.
Roger Mitchell was released in 2009 and has not been re-imprisoned .
10
Michael G . West was released October 7 , 2014 and has not been re -imprisoned.

9
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to deny parole forever to an inmate.. .” whose record indicates he has been

completely rehabilitated. In

case, the Board ’s decision focused on the

seriousness of the offense and the Board merely gave a cursory acknowledgement of
the statutory factors weighing in favor of

release. These factors include

the following:
LETTERS OF SUPPORT

Small Engine Repair instructor

Inmate Progress Reports
Correctional Officer
Support
Exodus Transitional Community
Employment Works
The Fortune Society
The Osborne Association

Community

•
•
•
•

Family Support

- Mother

Father
PROGRAM ACHIEVEMENTS

Academic
• High School Equivalency Diploma
Vocational
• Small Engine Repair
Therapeutic
• Aggression Replacement Training
• Phase II (Thinking for a Change)
• Alternatives to Violence Project
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•

New York State Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services
• Assessment of Alcohol
• Chemical Dependence Connection
• Preventing Fatal overdose
• Nicotine Dependence
• Interviewing in a Chemical Dependency Treatment Setting
• Traumatic Brain Injury and Chemical Dependency Connection
• The LGBTQ Client
• Pain and the Substance User
• Addiction medicine
• Medical Consequences of Addictive Disorders
• Addiction Medications
• Working with Aging Client Populations
• Know the Stakes: Alcohol, Substance Abuse, and Gambling
• Hepatitis
• Treatment of Pregnant Women
• Tobacco Myths
• Alcohol and Drug Primer
• Hepatitis C
• Opiates and Addiction Medication
• Marijuana Workbook
• Managing addiction as a Chronic Disease

Awards & Certificates
• Basic HIV/ AIDS
• Emergency Blood Spill Response
• Blood/Body Fluid Spill Clean Up
REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF EMPLOYMENT

( Welding )

PROPOSED RESIDENCE
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48.

The Board ’s intent to focus on the nature of the instant offense “is

corroborated by the boilerplate decision, which recites statutory language and

contains terse conclusory sentences”. ( See Matter of Darshan v. New York State

Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Et. al, supra); ( Matter of

West v. New York State Board of Parole, supra )’, ( Matter of Putland v. New York
State Board of Parole, Index No. 1895/2015 p. 6-7, (Sup.Ct., Orange Cty. 2015 ) (The
record leads the Court to the inescapable conclusion that the decision was “pre-

determined” and the hearing was over before it started ); ( Matter of Banks v. Stanford,
Index No. 2456/2014 (Sup.Ct. Putnam Cty. 2015) (The Board erred by focusing on

the nature of the instant offense in conclusory terms); and ( Matter of Gonzalez v. NYS
DOCCS Index No. 401130/14 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Cty. April 20, 2015) (Board focused
exclusively on the nature of the crime and did not comply with statutory duty. ).
49.

In Matter of McBride, Hon. Joan Posner stated:

the Board discussed Appellant’s positive accomplishments at the hearing, it
then concluded that his release was incompatible with ‘public safety and welfare. ’
The Board gave no analysis as to how or why it reached this conclusion . It appears to
have focused only on Appellant ’ s past behavior without articulating a rational basis
for reaching its conclusion that his release would be incompatible with the welfare of
society at this time.” ( See Matter of McBride v. Evans , 42 Misc3d 1230 (A ), 988
N . Y . S . 2d 523, (Sup. Ct . Dutchess Cty . 2014)). "

“While

50.

The Parole Board cannot “infuse their own personal beliefs into the

proceeding” where here, the Board was clearly more compelled by the instant

offense than any of the other factors required to be considered by statute. ( See Matter
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of Rabenbauer v. New York State Board of Parole, supra, quoting, Matter of King v.

New York State Division of Parole, supra ).

51.

The Board gave its opinion on the motive for the crime, to wit:

killed a
. Popped him up in the air, so he came down on his
head; because you wanted to steal from somebody, to get back at your parents”
( Id . pp 10)

“You’ve

“You are the center of your story,

52.

you, you, not your dad ’s behavior, you” (Id. pp 10)

The statutory mandates of Executive Law §259-i (2)( a ), (c)( A ) do not

require the Board to make decisions on their opinion of what compels them. The
discretionary authority conferred upon the Board requires it to consider “ if there is a

reasonable probability that, if

is released , he will remain at liberty

without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of

society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect

for the law.” See Executive Law §259- i ( 2)(c).
53.

The Board offers no explanation as to how they have determined “more

compelling.” In a similar instance, the Appellate Division , Third Department, had

noted; “The use of ‘nonstatutory, conclusory language,’ such as that employed by the
Board here, [i.e. ‘ more compelling] impermissibly leaves the reviewing court to
guess at the basis for the Board’s denial .” { See, Matter of Vaello v Parole Board

11

Moses McBride was released March JO, 2014 and has not been re -imprisoned.
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Division of State of New York , 48 A. D.3d 1018, 851 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3rd Dept .
2008)).12

54.

In

| case, the fundamental factor to be considered is whether

or not there is a reasonable probability that his release would pose a threat to society.
( See Matter of King v. New York State Division of Parole, supra , (“The establishment

of penal policy is not the role of the Parole Board or of any other administrative

agency . .. The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to
the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for [ murder in the
second degree and robbery in the first degree], but to determine whether, as of this
moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should be released . . . . For the

Board to simply decide that any case ... regardless of all of the other circumstances

surrounding the crime, automatically necessitates the denial of parole because of the
‘seriousness of the crime’ is

a breach of the obligation legislatively imposed upon it

to render a qualitative judgment based upon a review of all the relevant factors.”)

55.

The Court in Cappiello, ruled “ we must allow an individual who has

taken advantage of opportunities to rehabilitate himself to move beyond a horrific act
of many years ago and rejoin society to contribute according to his ability” ( See

12

Jose Vaello was released in 2012 and has not been re-imprisoned.
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Matter of Cappiello v. New York State Board of Parole, 6 Misc.3d 1010( A ), 800
N . Y.S.2d 343 (Sup.Ct. New York Cty. ( 2004)).13

56.

Moreover, the Court in Wallman v. Travis, supra, stated:

Parole Board ’s exclusive reliance on the severity of the offense to deny parole not only
contravenes the discretionary scheme mandated by statute, but also effectively constitutes an
unauthorized resentencing of the defendant ”

“A

57.

The Board ’s determination to deny

release was based on the

boilerplate determination that he “would not live and remain at liberty without again
violating the law, and your release would be incompatible with the welfare ... without
specifying new or additional relevant evidence in support of [its] determination” and

should be reversed. (See Matter of Marino v. Travis, 13 A.D.3d 453, 787 N.Y.S.2d 54
(2nd Dept. 2004)).

58.

The Board made this conclusion based on an interview of approximately

35 minutes, spanning on 21 transcript pages, excluding the cover, decision and

certification. This position is inconsistent with the facts.

record

unequivocally proves that he is rehabilitated and has met the statutory criteria for
release.

59.

Therefore, in light of the Board ’s failure to explain how they came to its

determination despite factors to the contrary and a rehabilitative record that strongly
supports release, Parole Board could not have given fair consideration to each factor

as required by law. ( See Matter of Platten v. NYS Board of Parole, 47 Misc.3d 1059,
13

John Cappiello was released in 2005 and has not been re -imprisoned .
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5 N.Y.S. 3d 702 (Sup.Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2015)).

excellent COMPAS

scores proving low risk for violence, rearrest, and criminal involvement are a clear
indication of readiness for parole.

COMPAS RISK ASSESSMENT
Criminogenic Need Scales
Low/
Unlikely

New York
Risk of Felony Violence
Arrest Risk
Abscond Risk

Medium

Probable

High

None

X
X
X

Criminal Involvement

Criminal Involvement
History of Violence
Prison Misconduct
Relationships/Lifestyle
Reentry Substance Abuse
Personality/Attitudes
Negative Social Cognitions
Low Sclf Efficacy/Optimism

-

X
X
X
X
X
X

Family
X
Low Family Support
Social Exclusion
X
ReEntry Financial
ReEntry Employment Expectations
X
Resulting in a Supervision Level of 4
(See Exhibit D (COMPAS Risk Assessment pp. 1 -2))

60.

The Board ’s determination to deny

release by focusing on

the seriousness of the offense minimizes his rehabilitative efforts, COMPAS Risk
Assessment and Case Plan results, and as such, is arbitrary and capricious, as well as

irrational bordering on impropriety and requires a de novo interview.
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THE BOARD FAILED TO CONSIDER
CPDO AS A MITIGATING FACTOR

61.

is a

|national, who entered the United States in

1980. A signed Order of Removal was issued on November 6, 1996, ordering that
be returned to

[. No application for relief from removal was filed

and appeal was waived, so that removal will proceed immediately upon
release from custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision.

62.

Once an inmate convicted of an A- l felony serves the minimum

sentence, he can be considered for parole. The applicant is “subject to conditions
imposed by the Parole Board” and as such, A - l felons can be considered for

Conditional Parole for Deportation Only (CPDO) ( See Abrams v. Stanford, 156
A.D.3d 846 (2nd Dept. 2017)).

63.

Recently, in Matter of Ciaprazi v. Evans, 52 Misc.3d 1212( A ) (Sup.Ct.

Dutchess Cty. 2016), Hon . James D. Pagones, J. ruled that
“The respondent’s determination, dated December 21, 2015, is annulled. The petition
is granted to the extent that the respondent New York State Board of Parole is
directed to issue a CPDO to the petitioner for prompt deportation pursuant to the
final order of deportation, dated January 16, 1998, issued by the Hon. Mitchell A.
Levinsky, Immigration Judge. The petition is in all other respects denied .”

64.

In addition to the existence of a final order of removal, there are

numerous other similarities between Ciaprazi and
Tier 2 tickets and 2 Tier 3 tickets, the last in 2012;

Ciaprazi received 19

received 2 Tier 2
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tickets and 1 Tier 3 ticket, the last in 2000, over 17 years ago. Ciaprazi ’s COMPAS
Risk Assessment scores were described as “positive” and he was determined to be

supervision level 4 ( the level requiring the least amount of post release supervision )
( See Ciaprazi v. Evans , supra );

scored “low risk” in every area except

substance abuse on his COMPAS Risk Assessment ( See Exhibit D (COMPAS Risk

Assessment )).
65.

Like the petitioner in Ciaprazi,

has programmed extensively

and has numerous letters of family and community support.

family in

has extensive

and has an offer of residence, as well as employment upon his

arrival there. (See Exhibit F (Parole Packet )).

66.

“It is settled that the Board of Parole is required to review and consider

certain statutory factors. ( Matter of Dolan v. New York State Board of Parole, 122
AD3d 1058, 1058 [3d Dept .2014]). One of the factors is petitioner’s immediate

deportation upon release from incarceration pursuant to a CPDO. .. . Noticeably
absent from the respondent’s decision was any mention of the deportation factor.”
( See Ciaprazi v. Evans, supra ). Also noticeably absent from

decision, as

well, was any mention of the deportation factor ( See Exhibit A ( Decision Notice)).

67.

The Board ’s failure to consider CPDO is arbitrary and capricious, as

well as irrational, bordering on impropriety, requiring a de novo interview.
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THE BOARD FAILED TO EXPLAIN HOW & WHY
THERE WAS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY
THA
WOULD REOFFEND AND HOW
RELEASE WOULD DEPRECATE THE CRIME
AND UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW

68.

In order to deny parole, Executive Law requires a finding of reasonable

probability that the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the
law, to wit:
“parole shall not be granted as a reward for good conduct or efficient perfonnance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such
inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law ...” [emphasis
added ] See Executive Law § 259-i( 2)(c)(A); ( See also Matter of Silmon v. Travis , 95 N.Y.2d
470, 476, 718 N .Y.S. 2d 704 ( N.Y . 2000)).

69.

Specifically,

decision denies parole based exclusively on

the nature of his instant offense, without any explanation or support of its finding, as

required by statute, that

will not live and remain at liberty without

violating the law See Executive Law § 259- i(2)( c)( A).
70.

See Matter of Flynn v. Travis, Index No. 19168/98 (Sup.Ct. Westchester

Cty. 1999), ( No showing was made of Flynn ’s “Present disregard for human life” and

the more remote the instant offense, the more incumbent for the Board to set forth a
rational basis for denial ).

71.

extensive therapeutic programming,( See Exhibit F ( Parole

Packet )), encompassing his entire 23 years of incarceration, it is incomprehensible
that the Board found

release would “be incompatible with the welfare of
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society and would so deprecate the serious nature of [his] crime as to undermine
respect for the law” ( See Exhibit A (Decision Notice)).

72.

To allow the Board to simply predicate a denial upon a deprecation

finding and a concern for public safety, without meaningful consideration and no
regard for all of the statutory factors, renders the entire process meaningless and

-

tantamount to re sentencing.

73.

Further, since there is no explanation or support for the statutory

requirement of a reasonable probability finding, the Board’s boilerplate and
conclusory determination is irrational, bordering on impropriety, as well as arbitrary

and capricious and a de novo interview must be ordered.

CONCLUSION

74.

The Parole Board erred by failing to consider

“attendant

circumstances” and youth as a mitigating factor, inappropriately focusing on the

serious nature of the instant offense, failing to adequately consider Conditional Parole
for Deportation Only and failing to explain how and why there was a reasonable
probability that|

muld reoffend.

75.

No previous application has been made for the relief requested herein.

76.

Therefore, based on the reasons stated herein, the Board ’s determination

is arbitrary and capricious, as well as, irrational bordering on impropriety and
requires a de novo interview.
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WHEREFORE, the Petitioner requests that a judgment under CPLR Article

78 be granted:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Dated:

Reversing and vacating Respondent’s determination of
April 28, 2017; and
Ordering, Respondent to hold a de novo interview within 30
days; and
Ordering that the de novo interview panel shall not be made
up of any member who sat on the April 25, 2017 Board, nor
any member who sat on the September 14, 2017 affirming
appeal panel ; and
Ordering such panel to adhere strictly to the statutory
requirements; and issue a determination that shall be
supported by the record; and
For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem
just and proper.

October 12, 2017

